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KEEPING GENDER ON THE AGENDA 
Theorising the Systemic Barriers to Women Lawyers in 
Corporate Legal Practice 
Joanne Bagust* 
Despite the implementation of policies and procedures to 
redress the gender imbalance at the higher echelons in 
Australian corporate law firms, only a paucity of women 
successfully tread the path to equity partnership. In this article, 
it is argued that it is the systemic, rather than the overt, barriers 
that present the major obstacle to sexual equality within the 
corporate legal workplace. Neo-Marxian thought, in particular 
the work of Charles Derber on the proletarianisation of 
professional workers, as well as contemporary feminist 
thought, is utilised to explore why profoundly gendered 
assumptions in relation to the ʻideal workerʼ norm remain 
deeply embedded in the mindsets and attitudes of those 
organising the legal workplace. It is suggested that fear of 
change to work practices within firms has not only an 
ideological but also a material base. It is economically 
determined. Highly trained women lawyers with family work 
responsibilities who take up flexible work arrangements in firms 
are fulfilling a proletarian role and their under-utilised labour is 
being extracted to increase profit share at the apex and 
facilitate the progress of their unencumbered colleagues along 
the path to partnership.  
For some time now, there has been incontrovertible empirical evidence 
produced in a plethora of studies across common law countries illustrating 
that women lawyers – particularly those with family work responsibilities – 
have not been accepted as full and equal citizens of the community of 
professional legal practitioners.1 Notwithstanding some genuine intent in 
major law firms to begin to redress the gender imbalance at the higher 
echelons within, the policies and procedures being implemented in 
Australian corporate law firms to improve the status of women lawyers are 
not working. As argued elsewhere,2 in many jurisdictions since the early 
2000s, in acknowledgement of the difficulties that most women face 
balancing the double day required as full-time workers and full-time 
                                                           
*  Lecturer, School of Law, Faculty of Business and Law, Deakin University. I would like to 
thank the anonymous reviewers of this article for their valuable suggestions. 
1  Hagan and Kaye (1995); Pierce (1995); Thornton (1996); Sommerlad and Sanderson 
(1998); Brockman (2001); Rhode (2001); Schultz and Shaw (2003); Williams and Thomas 
Calvert (2004); Mossman (2006). 
2  See Thornton and Bagust (2007), pp 776, 782–801. 
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mothers, women’s lawyers groups have sought more flexible working 
arrangements for women. However, the resulting equal opportunity policies 
and flexible work practices that have been implemented by firms in order to 
assist practitioners with family-work responsibilities have failed to plaster 
over the fissure between the trajectories of advancement for men and women 
lawyers. Indeed, paradoxically, these practices work as overt or indirect 
barriers to the career advancement of those who utilise them. 
Despite manifold attempts by women lawyers to promote change, work 
practices in major legal practice remain highly structured and geared to the 
clock under a formidable regime of long working hours. In Australia, a 
number of reports have provided snapshots and analysis of issues faced by 
women in legal practice across particular Australian states.3 A seminal report 
into flexible work practices in legal practice was the joint project conducted by 
the Law Institute of Victoria (LIV) and the Victorian Women Lawyers 
(VWL), reported on in 2006.4 That report identified the need to change what 
actually happens in law firms in order to develop optimism by way of making 
the benefits of family-friendly work practices and entrenched flexible work 
arrangements clear to all. The benefits identified included cost savings in 
retention and staff loyalty (increasing productivity and lowering recruitment 
costs), attracting the best-quality candidates and obtaining a superior 
reputation in the employer of choice stakes, both within the profession and 
with clients.5 The report called for the promotion of the necessary attitudinal 
change, building on the LIV’s influence with the stakeholders, by first sifting 
through the available resources, kits and guides on developing and 
implementing policies and guidelines on flexible work arrangements and on 
how to embed cultural change within organisations, and then adapting them to 
the legal profession. Once a willingness to accept that change happens and 
behavioural change occurs, the report advocates that a social marketing 
emphasis be adopted to encourage and maintain the gains.  
The ‘push and pull’ characteristics of the tenets of such a campaign6 adopt 
a similar strategic course to that identified in reports from other common law 
jurisdictions such as the American Bar Association’s Balanced Lives: Changing 
the Culture of Legal Practice report.7 They are practical and broad-ranging 
strategies for workers with family-work responsibilities (WFWRs) to better ‘fit 
in’ to major legal practice from the perspective of the power wielders who 
design the legal workplace. The suggestions in the report include: tackling 
                                                           
3  See New South Wales Department for Women (1995); Victoria Law Foundation (1996); 
Law Society of New South Wales Gender and Industrial Taskforce (1999); Victorian 
Women Lawyers (1999); Victorian Women Lawyers (2001); Victorian Women Lawyers 
(2006a); Victorian Women Lawyers (2010). 
4  Victorian Women Lawyers (2006b). 
5  Victorian Women Lawyers (2006b), pp 5–6. 
6  Victorian Women Lawyers (2006b), p 6. 
7  Rhode (2001). The report was prepared for the American Bar Association Commission on 
Women in the Profession 2001. See in particular the identification of best practices that 
can assist employees in structuring their careers, p 25. 
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practical barriers that exist (such as childcare, equipment, etc.); commandeering 
opinion leaders and building key stakeholder relationships – champions of the 
‘cause’ who can model preferred behaviour; peer education programs 
encouraging those who have adopted the preferred behaviour to educate others 
(by advising/mentoring/supporting through networks, etc.); and monitoring of 
key data (e.g. pay parity, numbers of people being promoted) that act as 
indicators of the changes over time, and adjustment to methods in place to 
compensate where required and adjust to new developments.8 Indeed, for some 
understandable reasons, the VWL’s 2010 report is pitched directly at law firm 
management. It specifically offers practical tools such as a ‘Flexible Work 
Proposal/Business Case’ and an ‘Individual Flexible Work Plan’ for utilisation 
by partners to assess the viability and practicality of implementing flexible work 
arrangements in their firms.9 
But will the elimination of overt barriers change the status quo and lead to 
equality of participation for women lawyers, particularly WFWRs working in 
the major law firms? It is argued here that it will not. Rather, it is suggested that 
preparing reports epistemologically grounded in market liberalism’s values10 and 
assumptions,11 and couched in the world-view of those directing major legal 
practice,12 can only produce changes that tinker at the edges of the social 
relations affecting the legal workplace. Indeed, however well intentioned, 
entering into the ideological fray that is the theoretical heartland of those who 
dictate the terms of legal practice has only served to elide the perspective of 
WFWRs and the complexity of the real material relations that exist in major law 
firms. It continues to be the case that when WFWRs bring their hide to the legal 
services market (expressed in terms in which the major players live their lives), 
they ‘have nothing to expect but a hiding’.13 Thus neo-Marxian thought is 
employed in this article as a critical theoretical tool to disinter the philosophical 
and epistemological underpinnings of the systemic barriers to women lawyers in 
corporate legal practice in Australia.  
                                                           
8  Victorian Women Lawyers (2006b), p 6. 
9  Victorian Women Lawyers (2010), pp 18–25. 
10  The current dominant discourse explaining the material and social relations that order the 
world goes under many guises. For example, Richard Sennett refers to this era as flexible 
capitalism in Sennett (1998), p 9. For Pierre Bourdieu, it is neo-liberalism, which is a 
discourse grounded in a utopian theory of a pure and perfect market that has been made 
possible by the politics of financial deregulation. The transformative effects of neo-
liberalism are achieved by measures such as calling into question any and all collective 
structures that serve as an obstacle to the logic of the market in order to protect foreign 
corporations and their investments from nation-states. See Bourdieu (1998). 
11  I refer in particular to market liberalism’s fundamental assumptions that are corrosive of 
the life-worlds of family and community, such as the assumption that unrestrained self-
interest and limitless material acquisition are good things if they prop up the market and 
the notion that human labour is no different to any other commodity. See Rudd (2006). 
12  See, for example, New South Wales Department for Women (1995); Victoria Law 
Foundation (1996); Law Society of New South Wales’ Gender and Industrial Taskforce 
(1999); Victorian Women Lawyers (1999, 2001, 2006a, 2006b, 2010). 
13  Here I have appropriated Marx. See Marx (1962), p 165.  
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Methodology 
This article is based on 50 interviews conducted in 2005 and 2006 with 
corporate lawyers working in ten of the major corporate and commercial law 
firms: five top-tier firms (by revenue) and five mid-tier firms operating in 
Melbourne, with national and/or international affiliations and offices.14 The 
qualitative research consisted of 50 semi-structured, in-depth interviews with 
partners, employed practitioners and also practitioners who had chosen to 
leave the employ of the ten firms selected. The participants were asked about 
their experiences and perceptions of work practices and the workplace 
culture within the firms in which they were working, and in the legal 
profession in general. The interviews were taped and were generally in the 
vicinity of one hour’s duration, with several ‘time-poor’ senior associates 
having to restrict the interviews to approximately 40 minutes and a number 
of the more expansive lawyers, particularly partners, generously contributing 
up to two hours of their time to the research. All interviews were 
confidential and were conducted on the understanding that all identifying 
data would be removed and a copy of the transcript made available upon 
request. The tapes were transcribed and the data then compiled and analysed.  
A small number of participants were lawyers who had been referred to 
the author as people who might be prepared to participate in the research by 
colleagues at La Trobe Law or former workplace colleagues at the Court of 
Appeal, Supreme Court of Victoria. In order to ensure methodological 
integrity, most participants were randomly selected from the websites of the 
selected firms and a small number of participants (solicitors) were obtained 
via the ‘snowballing’ effect with one interviewee recommending another. 
Initially, e-mails were sent to ten partners (of which some were staff 
partners, equity partners and junior partners), senior counsel and senior 
associates from each firm indicating the nature of the research being 
conducted and requesting their participation. Gender balance and diversity of 
experience across areas of practice was aimed for. Of the 50 interviews 
conducted, 30 partners (eighteen men and twelve women) were interviewed; 
six senior associates (five men and one woman) and three senior counsel 
(one man and two women), with the balance being employed solicitors or 
solicitors who had left the particular practice (one of whom was male). For 
reasons of confidentiality, where quotes from interviews appear in this 
article the interviewee is referred to only by gender and position held in the 
firm; Female Partner or Male Partner; Female Special Counsel or Male 
Special Counsel; Female Senior Associate or Male Senior Associate; and 
Female Solicitor or Male Solicitor; and the city and date of the interview. 
This article is necessarily an interpretative account of how these corporate 
lawyers view contemporary legal practice.  
                                                           
14  The research was undertaken for the author’s doctoral thesis on Work Practices and 
Culture in Major Australian Corporate Law Firms. 
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The Systemic Problem 
The research reveals that despite the relatively recent introduction of flexible 
work practices and more flexible partnership arrangements within firms, it is 
still the case, as argued by Margaret Thornton in her landmark research into 
the legal profession in Australia some fifteen years ago, that ‘otherness’ for 
women lawyers is ‘systematically factored into the structuring of 
contemporary legal practice, and has also lodged deep within the recesses of 
the legal psyche’.15 In her definitive theoretical analysis of the experience of 
women in Australia’s legal profession, Thornton notes the continued fringe-
dweller status of women in the legal profession. It is her argument that 
although women have been ‘let in’ to the legal profession, they are still 
represented as the ‘other’ against the normative benchmark, paradigmatic 
incarnation of legality – invariably a white, heterosexual, able-bodied, 
politically conservative, middle-class man.16 Thus, regardless of how 
competent and hard-working a woman in the legal profession may be, it is 
difficult for her to be accepted as an authoritative agent of legality because 
the feminine in legal culture continues to be represented as a dangerous force 
that is corrosive of rationality.17 
Thornton’s analysis appears to have stood the test of time: 
We’ve still got a couple of partners who I would say are not fully 
comfortable with working mothers. As extraordinary as that might 
seem, in this day and age, there are partners who are not comfortable 
with that.18  
For Thornton, as a ‘master narrative’, the law’s (re)presentation of 
polarised images of men and women has become enmeshed in the social 
script. Positivistic legal jurisprudence and judicial discernment have tended 
to essentialise the ‘woman’ of legal discourse not as the equal of her male 
counterpart, but rather as the embodiment of outmoded stereotypes. 
Furthermore, the ‘master narratives’ of law have tended to depict ‘woman’ 
as a homogeneous category: disorderly, a product of her sexuality, 
subordinate in marriage and with a purported ‘vacuity of mind’.19 As such, 
‘woman’ has come into being in law as the paradigmatic ‘other’ against 
whom the cerebral masculine ideal, the ‘benchmark man’ of law, has been 
defined.20  
These outmoded stereotypes would appear to prevail. Indeed, in his 
article examining how the interaction of law firm growth and its changing 
demography is reflected in the lawyer joke corpus, critical jurisprudential 
                                                           
15  Thornton (1996), p 8. 
16  Thornton (1996), p 2. 
17  Thornton (1996), pp 3–6. 
18  Female Partner, interview recorded in Melbourne 30 November 2005. 
19  Thornton (1996), pp 28–29. 
20  Thornton (1996), p 23. 
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scholar Professor Marc Galanter argues that sexism persists in the law firm 
setting, particularly in the hiring contest, where qualification is subverted by 
nepotism and sexual attraction.21 The joke that highlights his point is as 
follows: 
Three young women have all been working 80-hour weeks for six 
straight years in the struggle to make partner in the law firm and the 
cut-off date is fast approaching.  Each one is brainy, talented and 
ambitious – but there’s only room for one new partner. At a loss as to 
which one to pick, the senior officer finally devises a little test.  One 
day, while all three are out to lunch, he places an envelope containing 
$500 on each of their desks. 
The first woman returns the envelope to him immediately. The 
second woman invests the money in the market and returns $1,500 to 
him the next morning. The third woman pockets the cash. 
So which one gets the promotion to partner? The one with the 
biggest tits!22  
What is illuminative, but not funny for those women currently 
labouring in Australian corporate law firms, is that in the major firms, 
relationships of professional equality are purportedly based on merit: 
If you’re committed to merit and regardless of gender, I think that in my 
experience, and I go back the whole time with my period of practice of 
22 years, it’s always been based on that, then those questions (are there 
discriminatory practices in the profession?) don’t arise.23 
Nevertheless, the progress of women lawyers on the path to partnership 
continues – at least in some firms – to be contingent on their ability to 
engage the gaze of male lawyers, as objects of sexual desire: 
Q. Are you aware of discriminatory practices in the profession? 
A. … There is, in some departments, a ‘boysy’ sort of feel, I guess. 
Quite seriously, I think there is a tendency, possibly unconscious, 
particularly among some more senior males who are involved in 
employing people and or allocating work to women – to allocate 
work to women who are more physically attractive.24  
In this article, it is argued that the ‘master narrative’ of law continues to 
ground the systemic barriers to women lawyers’ advancement to the top of 
corporate law firms, and it is the systemic barriers, rather than the overt or 
indirect ones, that present the greatest challenge to substantive equality for 
                                                           
21  Galanter (2006), p 1443. 
22  Galanter (2006), p 1443. 
23  Male Partner, interview recorded in Melbourne, 20 October 2005. 
24  Male Senior Associate, interview recorded in Melbourne, 4 August 2005. 
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women lawyers. These barriers are the philosophical and epistemological 
assumptions that remain deeply embedded in the mindsets and attitudes of 
those organising the legal workplace, and over time they have proven to 
intractably defy redress. In order to better understand the gendered aspects of 
how corporate law firms function to affect corporate lawyers’ lives, this 
article undertakes a critical, theoretical exploration of those systemic 
barriers. Marxian25 theory on the proletarianisation of professional workers 
and contemporary feminist thought are utilised in order to inquire into any 
transformative possibilities that might have gone unseen in the hegemonic 
views of those who organise the workplace in the benchmark-setting major 
corporate law firms in Australia. 
Neo-Marxian Analysis of the Systemic Barriers to Women 
Lawyers in Corporate Legal Practice 
It must be said that the notion of the proletarianisation of corporate legal 
professionals does not sit easily with the marbled foyers, mirrored lifts and 
priceless artefacts studiously placed amidst the restrained leathered chic one 
encounters when entering the temples of major corporate legal practice. 
Nevertheless, the Marxian critique of political economy is arguably one of 
the most profound critical interrogations into the nature of work and the 
workplace that has ever been undertaken. Therefore, whether or not one has 
been acquainted with, or is compelled by, Marxian methodology and 
concepts, if they can be appropriated in order to analyse and illuminate the 
relations of domination that structure and limit the life-worlds of 
contemporary corporate lawyers, then that pursuit should prove worthwhile. 
For Marx, the class struggle between the bourgeoisie and proletariat 
saw the constant revolutionising of the instruments of production, and 
therefore the relations of production.26 His bourgeoisie epoch brought about 
‘uninterrupted disturbance of all social conditions, everlasting uncertainty 
and agitation’ because the needs of constantly expanding markets saw the 
bourgeoisie chase all over the surface of the globe, ‘nestling everywhere, 
settling everywhere and establishing connections everywhere’ in order to 
exploit the world market.27 Importantly for Marx, one of the profound 
changes that the bourgeois epoch brought to the history of mankind was the 
conversion of ‘the physician, the lawyer, the priest, the poet and the man of 
science, into its paid wage-labourers’28 so they too became proletarianised. 
                                                           
25  The term ‘Marxian’ rather than ‘Marxist’ is used in this article, taking into account Karl 
Marx’s declaration that ‘All I know is that I am not a Marxist’, as recalled by Friedrich 
Engels in a letter to Conrad Schmidt, 3 August 1890, cited in Jones (1996), p 661. 
26  By ‘bourgeoisie’ is meant the class of modern capitalists who are owners of the means of 
social production and employers of wage-labour. By ‘proletariat’ is meant the class of 
modern wage-labourers who, having no means of production of their own, are reduced to 
selling their labour-power in order to live. See Marx (1972a), p 335. 
27  Marx (1972a), p 338. 
28  Marx (1972a), p 338. 
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It must be said that much of the intellectual ‘hard yakka’ to establish the 
methodological approach that grounds this project (to explore the theory of 
the proletarianisation of professional workers in order to better understand 
contemporary corporate legal practice) was undertaken by Nancy Hartsock 
in the mid-1980s.29 At that time, Marxist intellectual pursuit, together with 
feminist theoretical rigour and political activism, was yet to become overtly 
déclassé within the neo-liberal academy.30 Hartsock developed a foundation 
for an account of power and class struggle in capitalist development that 
moved beyond the market model as the most influential mainstream 
theorisation of power. She argued that an epistemological relocation of the 
theorisation of power, from capitalism’s vantage point in market exchange to 
the standpoint of the proletariat in the production process, could expose ‘the 
systematically inhuman relations between human beings’ by locating their 
source in the production process.31 Of particular relevance to the analysis 
here is the notion in Marxian scholarship that analysis of economic 
phenomena should begin with a consideration of the nature of work and 
those who perform it, rather than analysis of the complicated structures of a 
developed commodity economy.32 
Hartsock explored Marx’s theory of knowledge, in particular the 
epistemological relationship between Marx’s depiction of levels of 
circulation (appearance) in society and levels of production (essence). For 
Hartsock, the level of circulation is ‘the theoretical home of the bourgeois 
world view’. There, categories of meaning (such as freedom of contract, 
exchange and competition as universal features of human existence) within 
which the capitalist lives his life are determined.33 The categories of meaning 
within which the proletarian lives his life, however, are determined within 
the level of production. As such, it is practical activity itself that determines 
both the proletarian standpoint and the possibility for the critique of 
capitalism. According to Marx, the concept of praxis, or human work, 
defines what it is to be human, and Marx speaks of the products of human 
work as ‘crystallized or congealed human activity’ or as ‘conscious human 
activity in another form’.34 For Marx, human attempts to satisfy physical 
needs direct both processes of consciousness and material existence. Human 
beings are what they do, and the division of labour’s systemically divergent 
practical activities give rise to the growth of logically divergent world 
views.35 Thus, in Marxian capitalist society, there is a dual vision of the 
                                                           
29  Hartsock (1985). 
30  For accounts of the demise of scholarship in the liberal university as a site of 
dissemination of knowledge for its own sake in the quest for the intellectual development 
of humanity, see Thornton (2001) and Readings (1996). 
31  Hartsock (1985), p 116.  
32  Hartsock adopts this position by reformulating George Lukacs’ analysis in ‘Reification 
and the Consciousness of the Proletariat’. See Hartsock (1985), p 118.  
33  Hartsock (1985), p 117.  
34  Marx (1974) pp 9, 21.  
35  Hartsock (1985), p 119. 
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world: one is in the form of the ruling-class or bourgeoisie understanding, 
rooted at the level of circulation or exchange, while the other is held by the 
proletariat at the level of production.36 Hence, albeit mediated through the 
writer as conduit, this article features the narratives of practitioners working 
at the level of production within corporate legal practice, and voicing their 
inner needs and views on how their workplace impacts on their life-worlds. 
It is acknowledged, however, that within the Marxian intellectual grid, for 
the purposes of this article, there is an ambivalence in relation to the 
epistemological positioning of equity partners. Although many labour at the 
coalface and, like other partners and their practitioner colleagues, are 
increasingly subject to bureaucratised management regimes and pressure to 
assuage the needs of ever-more demanding clients, it is doubtful that the 
equity partners interviewed for this research would, at first instance, identify 
themselves as being ‘proletarian’. Nevertheless, drawing on Derber’s theory 
on the proletarianisation of professional workers, I have argued elsewhere37 
that in the conditions that prevail in the mature and highly competitive neo-
liberal marketplace, even those at the apex of corporate legal practice are 
expressing concern in relation to their professional autonomy as they find 
themselves working more and more at the dictates of the whim and caprice 
of their corporate clients.  
It is evident that the changes in the nature of work that Marx identified 
in his bourgeois revolution can in some ways be seen to parallel those 
experienced in today’s globalised/neo-liberal world. Although largely 
viewed as evolutionary rather than revolutionary change, deregulation of 
economies and rapid technological changes have nevertheless brought about 
a ‘horrendous pace of change’, which has become a ‘trauma for a large part 
of the population’.38 As a result of that change, many workers now confront 
the prospect of having to perform at maximum pace for the rest of their 
working lives.39 Indeed, in the highly pressured, competitive world of 
corporate legal practice, the material conditions of their existence see 
corporate lawyers ever more pressured by management strategies to control 
not only the pace of their work: 
Every year things get faster … much of what I do requires me to be 
available pretty much 24 hours a day, seven days a week. So how 
would you cope without the remote access to the computer system, 
blackberries, telephones?40  
but also expectations of extended working hours:41 
                                                           
36  Hartsock (1985), p 119. 
37  Bagust (2013). 
38  Edward Luttwak in Martin and Schumann (1997), p 182.  
39  Martin and Schumann (1997), p 182. 
40  Male Partner, interview recorded in Melbourne, 13 December 2005. 
41  In particular, from equity partners in the major firms, some of whom partners from mid-
tier firms suggest should ‘get a more realistic idea of their worth in financial terms’ (Male 
Partner, interview recorded in Melbourne, 13 December 2005). 
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We are more profitable when we have people working long hours – 
long chargeable hours. I don’t think the clients encourage it all, but 
that’s the way we bill our clients and partners have very high 
expectations about the money that they take home, very high 
expectations. It is as if they couldn’t survive with a little bit less.42  
In order to facilitate the affluence of those at the apex of the firm’s 
structure and to tread the path to partnership, the norm of life for many 
corporate lawyers has become a lamentable state in which there is ‘no time 
for life, no time for exercise or leisure pursuits, and precious little time for 
family’:43 
I don’t think there is any work/life balance. There isn’t any real 
balance for your life. I think about it. My daughter’s almost eight and 
my son is 16 months, and you know, I had four months’ maternity 
leave with Katie44 and I came back full time and I used to say I saw 
her for an hour in the morning and an hour at night and a child’s life 
is seven days a week pretty much. That’s not enough … And you 
know you’re exhausted on holiday. I have just had a week off and I 
worked three of the days I was away.45 
You couldn’t go outside for a walk at lunchtime and that was 
frustrating. It affects your state of mind. You are not getting out into 
the sunshine, whether it is winter or summer. You are not as 
connected to the real world. You can’t think. You can’t walk off a bit 
of stress or anxiety. I was so stressed sometimes, I would just go 
home and lie on the couch and I couldn’t speak to Michael.46 It was 
just awful, awful. I was a zombie.47 
Clearly, stress is a major problem for those working in the contemporary 
legal workplace:  
Stress would be the number one killer of large firm lawyers. Literally 
and figuratively, you see partners, relatively young partners coming 
down with cancers and brain embolisms and yes, you’ve really got to 
wonder about the physical manifestation of stress because we work in 
an extremely stressful environment, both in terms of the people we 
work for and the timeframes around that.48 
                                                           
42  Female Partner, interview recorded in Melbourne, 22 November 2005. 
43  Stefanic and Delgado (2005), p 64. 
44  Pseudonym.  
45  Female Partner, interview recorded in Melbourne, 6 November 2005. 
46  Her husband (pseudonym). 
47  Female Solicitor, Interview recorded in Melbourne, 4 February 2006. 
48  Male Senior Associate, interview recorded in Melbourne, 20 October 2005. 
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Indeed, burnout49 amongst lawyers is known to smolder beneath the icy 
waters of egoistic calculation and material success, and it leads to 
psychological problems, including anxiety, depression, addiction and 
suicide.50 Marx proffered that the social conditions which characterised his 
bourgeois epoch51 fomented workplaces that mortified the bodies of workers 
and ruined their minds.52 The parallels here would seem to be worth 
exploring. 
But first, in utilising Marxian theory it must be acknowledged that there 
are doubts held by some scholars that Marxism is useful as a strategic theory 
of social change, especially for women. Christine Di Stefano, for example, 
argues that Marxism is so profoundly embedded within a masculinist horizon 
of meaning and sensibility that Marxist-feminist thought must be rendered 
misguided and is a (possibly) self-refuting hybrid.53 A quarter of a century ago, 
however, Heidi Hartmann found it logical to turn to Marxism as an analytical 
tool because Marxist philosophy was a well-developed theory for social 
change. She nevertheless cautioned against being side-tracked from feminist 
objectives.54 For Hartmann, in order to better understand Western liberal 
democratic society and women’s position as women within it, Marxist analysis 
provided some essential insights into the laws of historical development – 
particularly those of capital, which have evolved to prescribe women’s lives.55 
It is argued here that Hartmann’s assertion remains valid. 
There is no doubt that the Marxian challenge to the hegemony of political 
economy, and its machinery, is intellectually constructed on an ontological and 
epistemological framework of masculinist transcendence.56 Marx’s procedure 
in his account of ‘human labour’ was in fact ‘to set out from men’s labour and 
to ignore the specificity of women’s labour’.57 Hence, in his critical challenge 
to the bourgeois epoch, Marx abjectly failed to capture substantive dimensions 
of women’s lives, and therefore human existence. His theory of alienated 
labour is therefore necessarily deficient and in need of restoration before it can 
carry the resonance it deserves for the men and women who labour in legal 
practice in the neo-liberal, global epoch.  
In erasing the questions of sex and gender in relation to women’s labour 
from his account of the systemic oppression of workers by a dominant 
grouping, it is evident that Marx over-simplified the complex power 
                                                           
49  In Australia, the burnout syndrome in legal practice was noted back in 1985 to have 
become a ‘sign of the times’. See Norquay (1985), p 337; Chung (1995); Wentworth 
(2005), p 26.  
50  Gautam (2006).  
51  Marx (1972a), p 338. 
52  Marx (1972b), p 60. 
53  Di Stefano (1991a), p 147. 
54  Hartmann (1981), p 30.  
55  Hartmann (1981), p 2. 
56  Di Stefano (1991a), p 147. 
57  Hartsock in Di Stefano (1991a), p 152.  
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relations that underpin the material reality of alienated existence. 
Nevertheless, his account of human labour in the bourgeois epoch still 
provides a very useful starting point for a discussion on the social meanings 
of the chasm which divides the legal workplace today. 
Charles Derberʼs Refinement of Proletarianisation Theory  
For Marx the proletarian was a working man driven to self-estrangement 
and pitted in the class warfare of labour against a capitalist who was 
dominated by money-worship.58 Corporate lawyers, on the other hand, as the 
‘conceptive ideologists of capital’,59 have long been equated with elitism and 
control, and would appear at first instance to be more appropriately 
categorised as bourgeoisie. In his thesis on the proletarianisation of the 
professional, Charles Derber argued that professionals in advanced Western 
societies increasingly were becoming subject to the power and control of 
others. As such, in the ‘new knowledge’ and service markets, professional 
workers were experiencing the subordination to public bureaucracies and 
corporate power that had long been endured by other workers.60  
Derber’s theory on mental labour in advanced capitalism contradicted 
the social theorists of the time, who argued that professionals as the new 
knowledge workers in advanced economies61 were at the core of a new 
technocracy that was ‘wrestling power from the captains of industry’.62 
Others had identified a rise in professional imperialism emanating from the 
rise of professional authority in the new technocratic order.63 The basic tenet 
of Derber’s argument was that professional workers were becoming less and 
less authority figures who were able to maintain control over their own tasks 
and objectives. Their work was increasingly subject to the control and 
direction of management, and their knowledge – if still intact – was 
becoming so specialised and narrowed that it no longer served as a basis for 
power and control.64 
Derber identified employed professionals as the key new actors in 
contemporary capitalism. In accord with sociological and class theorists of the 
time,65 he observed that although the numbers of employed professionals had 
                                                           
58  Tucker argues that Capital should be read as a drama rather than a straight treatise of 
economics. It treats capitalism as a quasi-religious phenomenon. See Tucker (2001), 
p 203. 
59  Cain (1979), p 331. 
60  Derber (1982a), pp 4–7. 
61  These theorists were writing in the 1970s and 1980s. The research for this article revealed 
the contradictory ways in which the technological advances that underpin market 
liberalism in the new millennium interact with, but generally support, Derber’s theory of 
the proletarianisation of the professional (in corporate legal practice). 
62  See Galbraith (1967). 
63  See Illich et al (1977).  
64  Derber, (1982a), pp 7–9. 
65  Among whom he cites Bell (1976); Touraine (1971); and Poulantzas (1975).  
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increased markedly, the opportunities for self-employed professionals had 
declined to the same extent.66 Derber explored the meaning and implications 
of the ‘new dependent employment’ for the organisation and identity of 
professional workers. He argued that salaried professionals were losing their 
autonomy over both the means and the ends of their labour. They were 
becoming deprofessionalised. Those who lose control over the means of their 
labour are subject to a process he termed technical proletarianisation. They 
lost control over the process of the work itself and had little control over 
bureaucratic regimes, rhythm or pace of the work they performed.67 It is 
certainly the case in corporate legal practice that management practices are 
functioning to deliver less, rather than more, control for practitioners over the 
processes of their work: 
Look – the internal bureaucracies of the big firms are mind-boggling. 
I came from a mid-tier at the start and it’s far more corporate here in 
a sense and it’s incredibly structured. You can’t scratch your bum 
without having to speak to four people basically.68  
Q. So are all things a little more formal now in terms of management? 
A. They are, we are managed a whole lot more like a business … And 
when at the same time as working your people harder your 
mechanisms for screwing down costs are now much stricter, they 
involve a whole lot more bureaucracy and a whole lot more imitation 
of how a business would operate, and that involves more time. To get 
a cheque out now is a horror experience.69  
Those who lose control over the ends of the labour – that is, the goals 
and social purposes to which their work is put – are subject to what Derber 
termed ideological proletarianisation.70 Derber argued that salaried 
professional workers were subject to ideological proletarianisation as their 
integrity was being threatened by the expropriation of their values or sense 
of purpose in the post-industrial workplace.71 This caused a profound loss of 
independence, which for those workers crystallised in the loss of their ability 
to define the ends to which their work was directed. They therefore became 
– like other workers – mere functionaries, losing the chance to align 
themselves with the central professional service goal, which is to serve those 
in need with the highest standards of humane and technical practice.72 
It is the case that many lawyers as professional workers in the top-tier 
firms are subject to the ‘heteronomous management practices, authority and 
control’ as identified by Derber, and undoubtedly the legal profession’s 
                                                           
66  Derber (1982b), p 168.  
67  Derber (1982b), p 169. 
68  Male Partner, Interview recorded in Melbourne 7 December 2005. 
69  Male Senior Associate, Interview recorded in Melbourne, 4 August 2005. 
70  Derber (1982b), p 169. 
71  Derber (1982b), p 172. 
72  Derber (1982b), p 174. 
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‘excessive proximity to business clients and their money’73 is also highly 
problematic. Indeed, not only is the discretion and autonomy of individual 
lawyers subject to those controlling work practices within their firms: 
Partners won’t really tell you about a matter so you can give a 
considered viewpoint – It’s ‘You are just going to do what I tell you 
and if you do it badly, well great, because I don’t want you on the 
team anyway.’ So it is control through knowledge. And it is not even 
intellectual knowledge. It’s not that you have to be bright to know it. 
It is simply about controlling it … So you are scrambling around 
trying to find out some way to get on a footing with them. 
Q. So it’s not an honest approach where they are trying to get the best 
out of you, to grow you? 
A. No, because they don’t want too many people at the top sharing 
the profits. It is an apex. It isn’t a pie.74 
but the autonomy of the firms to operate as a micro-centre of power vis-à-vis 
their clients is highly questionable under the pressured conditions for 
business in the neo-liberal market economy: 
Lawyers are now bit parts of project teams where you have a goal to 
achieve. And that means that you have an imperative which is the 
client’s commercial aim and that is not always consistent with your 
obligations in relation to conflict and in relation to professional 
courtesy.75  
It is clear that the loss of autonomy in the legal workplace is impacting 
on lawyers as lawyers, irrespective of their gender.76 Nevertheless, it will 
now be argued that the process of the proletarianisation of professional 
workers functions very specifically to deleteriously impact on the lives of 
women lawyers with family work responsibilities who are working in 
corporate law firms. 
Sex and the New Legal Proletariat 
The Gendered Norm of the Long Hours Regime 
Although the research revealed some dissenting opinion from a few senior 
partners regarding the extent and characterisation of hours currently being 
                                                           
73  Walker (2005). 
74  Female Solicitor, Interview recorded in Melbourne, 23 January 2006. 
75  Female Partner, Interview recorded in Melbourne, 28 July 2005. 
76  The impact of the process of the proletarianisation of professional workers on both the 
nature of work and the nature of those performing it in the major corporate law firms is 
analysed in detail elsewhere. See Bagust (2013). 
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worked,77 it is generally accepted that the organisation of work in corporate 
law firms continues to be designed around an entrenched long-hours 
regime.78 Indeed, horror stories regarding the long-hours culture abound: 
Look, the reason why – it [flexible hours] does not work is that to run 
a good sustainable practice, it’s 24/7. If you say, ‘I’m going to work 
Monday, Wednesday and Friday’, that’s fine for you but for the 
clients, unless they’re very, very accommodating clients, it just 
doesn’t fit. 
Q. So it’s client driven? 
A. Yes. Client driven … In order to deliver a good service to a client, 
which is as good if not better than any of your competitors, you’ve 
just got to be here. 
Q. 24/7? 
A. Not that we always work those hours but the clients know and will 
ring you whenever they choose to.79 
What’s frightening I think is that a lot of the junior people wear it as a 
badge of honour that they’ve worked 24, 48 hours straight. Frankly, I 
think they’re dangerous at that point because they’re not capable of 
thinking straight … You can’t draft a sensible document when you’ve 
been working those sorts of hours.80 
Jurisprudential scholar Joan Williams argues that the long-hours regime 
in major legal practice is built on the masculine norm of immunity from 
family work. In her examination of the conditions that produce the system of 
organising market work and family work in Western liberal democracies, 
Williams has developed the construct of the ‘ideal worker’. For Williams, 
market work is organised around the notion of an ideal worker who works 
full time, plus overtime, and takes little or no time off for childbearing or 
childrearing.81 As such, this ideal worker norm is framed around traditional 
life patterns of men and excludes most mothers of childbearing age.82 
According to Williams, the ideological base for the structure of market work 
is the gender system of domesticity. The two defining characteristics of 
domesticity are, first, its organisation of market work and, second, its system 
of economically marginalising caregivers and effectively preventing them 
                                                           
77  One partner, for example did not identify a long hours culture in law firms at all but rather 
a service-oriented culture. For him the hours and time of the day were less relevant than 
the servicing of clients. 
78  This is consistent across common law jurisdictions. For example, see Johnson (1991); 
Smith (2006); Wallace (1997). 
79  Male Partner, interview recorded in Melbourne, 2 February 2006. 
80  Female Partner, interview recorded in Melbourne, 8 September 2005. 
81  Williams (2000), p 1.  
82  Although Williams’ focus is on family and work conflict in the United States, her thesis 
can clearly be applied in other Western liberal-democratic nation states.  
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from undertaking social roles that offer responsibility and authority other 
than that administered in the familial or domestic sphere.83 For Williams, 
domesticity establishes norms that are identified by successful gender 
performance of breadwinner/housewife roles and their associated character 
traits. Under domesticity’s ideological regime, aligning with Enlightenment 
ideals of the human nature of both genders,84 men are described as 
competitive and aggressive, and therefore ‘naturally’ belong in the market. 
By contrast, women – because of their focus on relationships, children and 
an ethic of care – ‘naturally’ belong at home.85 
Those ideological notions are still very evident in the minds of 
contemporary corporate legal practitioners: 
But I say families [are a career barrier] because sadly, until we’re 
able to turn Arnie Schwarzenegger into reality, only women can have 
babies. So they are the ones who have the most immediate decision to 
make: ‘Do I stay at home or do I get the nanny in and hand over 
responsibility?’ And I still think there’s probably a great feeling of 
responsibility on the maternal side, for societal reasons, because 
society tells us that the men go out and work and the women will stay 
home and look after the children, so it’s a very difficult issue and 
we’ve been trying to find ways to address it here. And it still is an 
issue. So it is an impediment in the sense that it means that the female 
member who has a family, can’t go on to be a partner … The practice 
tends to be: ‘Get your partnership, then have your family.’86 
Williams points out that although the ideal worker norm doesn’t define 
all jobs, it does define the good ones, such as high-level executive and 
professional positions.87 Certainly, the ideal worker norm serves as a 
principal systemic barrier to career advancement for most women, 
particularly WFWRs. The long hours expected are inimical to the retention 
and full professional development of most WFWRs, but nevertheless are 
continuing to serve as a rite of passage along the path to partnership: 
I think the long hours culture comes from a different generation who 
worked in that way and they think ‘This is the school of hard knocks. 
I came through it and it was fine for me and when I was your age I 
had to work.’ Lots of those partners and senior people still work those 
hours and they’re bitter and twisted about it. They still say ‘If you’re 
                                                           
83  Williams (2000), p 1. 
84  Those assigned to men and women by the philosophical dictates of liberal individualism. 
See Jagger (1988), pp 46–47.  
85  Williams (2000), pp 1–2. 
86  Male Partner, interview recorded in Melbourne, 22 November 2005. 
87  Williams (2000), pp 1–2. 
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going to get anywhere, that’s important.’ And changing that culture is 
very subtle.88  
What is not so subtle, and not so plausible if the assumptions 
underpinning it are unpacked, is the inference that women lawyers who have 
family commitments cannot work hard at their jobs. What is assumed is that 
family commitments take up time that should be dedicated to the firm. Such 
a notion appears to take no account of quality of work produced so long as 
the requisite number of ‘billables’ are produced in doing it. In such a 
reckoning, even the most brilliant work, if performed by part-time workers 
in smaller snatches, counts for little unless the ‘hard yards’ can be seen to be 
performed by the number of billable hours recorded on the slate, as the 
mindset of one lawyer confirmed: 
Barriers that impede career advancement do vary a lot from person to 
person but my observations would be not being willing to do the 
‘hard yards’. We’re still very much a profession that values hard 
work and so that often cuts out women with family commitments.89 
It is a well-researched phenomenon that women in the workplace must 
often work harder than men to prove that they are capable of performing the 
job required.90 Certainly a beneficial subject position for a woman with her 
eye on her career path is that of a pseudo male: 
I decided for the first time in my performance review I was going to 
go in as a male, and I was going to negotiate it like a bloke, and I was 
going to be tough with them and I was going to tell them exactly 
what figure I wanted. So I got data from the industry, from someone 
who had access to that data and I waved it in front of them and they 
responded accordingly which I was absolutely astonished about. They 
gave me a whacking pay rise and I must say I’m very happy with it.91 
If you’re a woman, unless you can outdo them in the masculine 
model you haven’t got a hope.  
Q. So the women who make it in the firms are the pseudo males? 
A. Yes, most girls will tell you, most young lawyers will say, ‘The 
women are worse to work for than the men.’ They will all say that ‘I 
hate the female partners.’ … The one thing that really, really astounds 
me is the degree to which they have licence to treat people so badly.92 
                                                           
88  Female Partner, interview recorded in Melbourne, 10 November 2005. 
89  Female Partner, interview recorded in Melbourne, 22 November, 2005. 
90  For example, see Friedan (1981), pp 256–57; Fuchs Epstein (1993), pp 278–79.  
91  Female Special Counsel, interview recorded in Melbourne, 8 November 2005. 
92  Female Solicitor, interview recorded in Melbourne, 23 January 2006. 
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For women who are other than pseudo males, much of their bravado is 
used to battle unfounded assumptions in the mindsets of colleagues that if 
they are WFWRs working part time, they are not committed to the firm: 
I’ve worked part-time for a long time and … you need to be very 
organised and I think you also need to put in extra. It’s almost like 
you have to prove yourself, to prove that you’re committed. It’s like, 
‘Yes, of course I can do that, and sure, I’ll do that on my day off. No 
problem!’ You’re really having to prove yourself 110 per cent.93 
It is worth considering whether, from the standpoint of those setting the 
agenda in contemporary market-driven legal practice, there is good reason to 
continue to set WFWRs adrift from the path to partnership. In the mid-
1990s, Margaret Thornton’s research revealed that the growth of mega-
firms, with their inevitable bureaucratisation, had led to a significant 
increase in the proportion of employed solicitors who were lacking in 
autonomy and independence. In addition, she noted that that 
bureaucratisation within these firms was a gendered phenomenon, increasing 
the power of elites at the upper echelons and decreasing that of those at the 
base. Further, that hierarchical ordering led to ‘superordinate positions 
becoming masculinised, and subordinate positions becoming feminised, in 
accordance with the conventional social script’.94  
More than a decade on, little – if anything – has changed. Flexible work 
practices, part-time work and job-sharing are all seen as subordinate 
positions and the purview of women.95 It is the case that in an environment 
in which: 
partners in the big firms want the big dollars and that means that the 
people in the firms have to work harder and harder for more of the 
year.96  
WFWRs who take up flexible work arrangements are in fact seen by those in 
superordinate positions within firms as the factory fodder necessary to fulfil 
a subordinate – indeed proletarian – role.97 In so doing, both the lifestyle 
patterns for the superordinate individuals concerned and the profit-share for 
the firms can be maintained. As such, this proletariat can be distinguished 
from that of Marx,98 in that it is sexed. Its members comprise mothers who 
                                                           
93  Female Partner, interview recorded in Melbourne, 22 November 2005. 
94  Thornton (1996), p 271. 
95  Thornton and Bagust (2007), pp 786–95.  
96  Male Partner, interview recorded in Melbourne 20 November 2005. 
97  Sommerlad (2002), p 217.  
98  Feminists have noted that Marx was gender blind in his critique of the antagonistic 
division of labour in capitalist production. His concept of human nature, in privileging 
what he actually saw as ‘productive labour’ over ‘reproductive labour’, which he failed to 
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have made the decision to partake in the flexible work practices on offer 
from their firm on their return to paid work. Nevertheless, if resplendent in 
their fecundity, they are tarnished by their toil: 
Those people who work those hours [flexible hours] tend to be in 
jobs which are, perhaps not dead end, but like, doing corporate 
secretarial issues or doing bulk mortgage type of work.99 
The vast majority of women I know who have been on maternity 
leave come back and end up doing precedent work, which is 
considered the career graveyard. It’s basically ensuring that there are 
precedent documents and knowledge management and it’s 
unglamorous and unexciting work as a general rule.100 
Not for these women, the intellectual stimulation and emotional buzz of 
autonomously building their practice, working with clients and closing deals. 
Rather, they are assigned knowledge-management work, such as preparing 
and updating precedent documents in order to support the dealings of their 
live-wired and ‘on track’ colleagues.101 As such, they can be seen to be 
technically proletarianised102 by the regimentation and routinisation of the 
work they perform:103  
Typically when women go off and have families and come back, they 
do not come back as a practising lawyer. They might go and work in 
knowledge management or they might do a stint in – it used to be 
markets and HR … It’s basically assembling the knowledge that the 
firm has – notices and documents and all those sorts of things … I’m 
trying to think if there are any people in knowledge management who 
are not women.104  
Sex-ordered Job Segregation? 
Worthy of re-examination here is the important Marxist feminist of 
‘patriarchal ordering’ by Heidi Hartmann. What is distinctive about 
Professor Hartmann’s analysis is that she firmly rivets the concept of 
patriarchy to a material, rather than ideological, base – that is, men’s 
historical control over women’s labour power by excluding women from 
                                                                                                                              
see as complicit with patriarchal ideology and masculine sensibility. See Di Stefano 
(1991b), p 134. 
99  Male Senior Associate, interview recorded in Melbourne, 4 August 2005. 
100  Female Senior Associate, interview recorded in Melbourne, 6 October 2005. 
101  Thornton and Bagust (2007), p 788. 
102  Derber (1982b), p 169. 
103  Derber (1982b), p 171. 
104  Female Partner, interview recorded in Melbourne, 1 December 2005. 
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access to certain productive resources (such as prestigious, highly paid jobs) 
and restricting women’s sexuality.105 
Hartmann defined patriarchy as ‘a set of social relations between men, 
which have a material base, and which, though hierarchical, establish or 
create interdependence and solidarity among men that enable them to 
dominate women’.106 She argued that the historical emergence of capitalism, 
with its ‘free market’ in labour, threatened patriarchal control based on 
institutional authority, particularly in the family. The successful extension of 
male–female dominance–dependence into the wage-labour market, however, 
sustained the system of patriarchal dominance and proved to be a key basis 
for women’s continued subordinate status.107 Indeed, Hartmann depicted 
patriarchy as women’s struggle against men, and she was highly critical of 
the actions of male workers in limiting the participation of women in the 
labour market throughout the historical evolution between patriarchy and 
capitalism. Further, for Hartman, patriarchal social relations in the nuclear 
family, reinforced by the state and religion, ensured that women became 
more dependent on men economically, and she argued that the dominant 
position of men was maintained not only by capitalism itself in controlling 
the labour process, but also by ‘ordinary men, men as men, men as workers’ 
who instituted sex-ordered job segregation in the labour market.108 
It must be acknowledged here that in the interview process conducted 
for this research, no evidence was found of any overt ‘council of war’ by 
male practitioners, either as men or as workers, to limit the participation of 
their female colleagues. Nevertheless, work practices in corporate law firms 
do facilitate the maintenance of the dominant position of male lawyers, and 
the justification for the retention of these practices would appear to be 
steeped in systemic attitudes and beliefs about traditional gender roles. 
Certainly, it is worryingly evident that the WFWRs who elect to take 
advantage of flexible work practices are, upon their return to work, subjected 
to sex-ordered job segregation as identified by Hartmann. Undoubtedly, this 
practice enables workers without family-work responsibilities to increase 
efficiencies in their individual business units and to proceed more rapidly 
along their career paths within the firm. It is, of course, being achieved on 
the backs of the under-utilised labour of highly trained women lawyers who 
happen to have family-work, in addition to their paid work, responsibilities. 
The Legal Proletariat 
The notion that women lawyers serve as a legal proletariat is not new. In 
1988, in their research into class structure and legal practice among lawyers 
in Canada, Hagan and colleagues concluded that in the legal profession in 
Toronto, women lawyers – especially those not employed full time – were in 
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an underclass of semi-autonomous employees and were more than twice as 
likely as men to be found there.109 Women were significantly and 
disproportionately under-represented amongst those the authors classed as 
managerial bourgeoisie, supervisory bourgeoisie and small employers.110 
Interestingly, the data suggested that women could well have been getting to 
the top of the profession in increasing numbers if time in the profession was 
taken into account.111 Such a finding would appear to reflect the ‘flush of 
success’ of second-wave feminism112 before it was blackened at the roots by 
the chilling dawn of neo-liberal ascent. 
In the hierarchy of corporate and commercial law firms, however, the 
authors noted that a working-class category of lawyers existed. They were 
sometimes called the ‘junior drones’. These comprised in large part new 
associates who were subject to a very explicit kind of exploitation. Then, a 
new associate earning $43,500 per year would be expected to bill 
approximately 2500 hours in a year at a charge-out rate of $87 per hour, and 
thus generate around $217,000 in revenue for the firm.113 The large element 
of decimating lackeying and drudgery borne by the ‘drones’ at the bottom of 
the pyramidal law firm structure, who were at the behest and control of 
lawyers up the ladder with the ability to command the firm’s human 
resources, was largely expected within the profession – and indeed 
considered a necessary part of achieving partnership.114 The inequality 
experienced in such case would be accepted as a precursor to the expected 
upward mobility. Hagan and colleagues noted that as a result of their 
domination and limited autonomy, and because their exploitation was clear, 
the ‘junior drones’ formed part of the new ‘professional proletariat’.115 
Unlike Marx’s proletariat, however, their high salaries and good prospects 
for upward mobility allowed ‘little prospect of rebellion’,116 let alone the 
formation of a revolutionary consciousness!  
Considering the construct of a legal proletariat, the position of new 
associates as ‘junior drones’ can be distinguished from that of women lawyers 
as a ‘stable of galley slaves’117 toiling in knowledge management. These 
women, particularly if they are returning from maternity leave, have very 
limited prospects of getting back on the upwardly mobile track, let alone 
                                                           
109  Hagan et al (1988), p 31. 
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treading the path to partnership. Further, they can generally expect little help 
along the way from on high, as the time they spend with their children is seen 
as incompatible with progress in the professional services firm: 
Q. So if you want to go down the partnership track you really have to 
think about whether to take time out or not? 
A. Yes, and if you go away, you can’t go away for too long. 
Q. And if you are going to have babies – restrict it to one? 
A. Ah! It just wipes your career.118 
Well, judging from the partnership, I don’t think the way professional 
services firms are set up is compatible with women spending time, or 
in fact people spending time, with children … I think the firm’s 
structure is against it and I suppose the firm structure is the barrier to 
advancement.119 
Within the major firms, however, there are many women lawyers who 
are putting in extremely hard yards to get the major firms to face the 
challenges of retaining and promoting women in the law firm environment. 
Many are members of Australian Women Lawyers (AWL) and/or Victorian 
Women Lawyers (VWL). To give credit to the firms, some sponsor these 
organisations by providing funding, furniture and equipment, and secretarial 
support, and by funding events.120 In her speech to the 17th Women, 
Management & Employee Relations Conference in Sydney in 2005, Kate 
Jenkins noted that the business case for change to the family-unfriendly 
culture within firms has been researched and is convincing, and that she, in 
concert with the VWL 2006 Report,121 had argued that law firm culture fails 
to heighten the participation of women with young children in the 
profession. She further argued that the ‘resistance to change is based on fear 
of change’.122 
There are compelling aspects to Jenkins’ analysis. No doubt, fear of 
change to the way work has always been done in the profession is a 
repressive element, but if proletarianisation theory is added to the equation, 
it might well be that the fear that is preventing transformative change to 
work practices is economically determined. As such, resistance to change is 
based not merely on an abstract fear of change for the sake of change or 
change from a ‘comfort’ zone, but rather on the very material fear of losing 
an unacknowledged but important employment strategy to maintain market 
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share and profit goals by employing a highly qualified and efficient ‘reserve 
army’ of female workers ‘to service the master-craftsmen partners’.123 
Conclusion 
Neo-Marxian analysis of the proletarianisation of professional workers 
reveals that many corporate legal professionals operating within the legal 
workplace today are experiencing a decline in their professional autonomy. 
Buffeted about by the highly competitive forces at play in the neo-liberal 
marketplace, corporate lawyers are finding their professional autonomy 
increasingly subject to bureaucratisation by their firms and control by their 
clients. They are at risk of becoming proletarianised, irrespective of their 
gender. Derber’s neo-Marxian analysis of itself, however, is gender-blind, as 
was the Marxian account of the bourgeois epoch. Therefore, in examining 
the proletarianisation process as it is occurring in corporate law firms, this 
article has utilised a myriad of feminist theoretical positions to interrogate, in 
particular, the parlous position of women lawyers – particularly those with 
family work responsibilities – in corporate law firms. 
WFWRs are subject to a kind of double jeopardy in that not only must 
they, in accord with their male counterparts, deal with the stresses brought 
about by the technical and ideological proletarianisation process that is 
occurring within their firm, but they must also confront systemic workplace 
discrimination. Indeed, the first hurdle that women in corporate legal 
practice must face before they can expect to tread the same path to 
partnership as their male colleagues is a systemic one. It is the resilient 
‘culture’124 that remains hostile to substantive equality for women. It is 
argued here that the mindsets and attitudes of those in the higher ranks of 
corporate legal practice remain philosophically and epistemologically 
buttressed in liberalism’s profoundly gendered assumptions in relation to the 
ideal worker norm and traditional gender roles. These factors have not been 
fossilised into the annals of history. Rather, they remain the basis of the 
values that ground material and social relations within the corporate legal 
workplace, and continue to function to delimit women’s labour power. They 
are the principal reason why best efforts to implement sex equality measures 
within firms remain largely unsuccessful. 
Undoubtedly, in the highly competitive, workplace environment in which 
corporate lawyers operate today – one in which ‘for a long time it’s been dog eat 
dog’125 – places at the top of the apex are harder and harder to come by: 
It is much more difficult for people to get into partnership now. 
People are having to wait eight or ten years. It is a big change … and 
there are a lot of lawyers coming into the marketplace.126  
                                                           
123  Sommerlad and Sanderson (1998), p 266. 
124  Referred to as a ‘need for attitudinal change’ in the empirical studies. For example, see 
NSW Department for Women (1995), p 4; Victorian Women Lawyers (2006a), p 5. 
125  Male Partner, interview recorded in Melbourne, 13 December 2005. 
126  Male Partner, interview recorded in Melbourne, 7 December 2005. 
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Prospects for real change to the status quo in Australian corporate law firms 
in which the normative partner is male therefore appear to be quite remote. 
Those at the apex are: 
anticipating taking home high hundreds of thousands – a million 
dollars plus a year – and doing that on the backs of charging people 
out at hourly rates in a market which is very tight and where you 
can’t just keep increasing your hourly rates as a magic pudding …127 
It is therefore improbable within the prevailing workplace culture that 
lawyers jostling in the ranks for a stronger foothold on the partnership path 
will gladly renounce the material privilege or the prerogative that has been 
accorded to them on the basis of the ideal worker norm. As the Chief Justice 
of Victoria has noted, ‘there are some on the dark side who would seem to 
resent women’s achievements in the law. Perhaps they see the women 
promoted as taking their place, their prize.’128 Likewise, in a workplace in 
which workers’ energies are directed towards individual advancement 
opportunities rather than making common cause with other workers,129 it 
does not seem likely that WFWRs will pick up the gauntlet and associate in 
order to take direct action against their oppressive workplace regime. 
Any attempt to transform the systemic barriers that underpin the 
continuing gender divide in corporate law firms will require nothing less 
than destabilising the culture and mindsets of those organising the corporate 
legal workplace. I have shown that corporate law firm profits are currently 
being maximised on the backs of the under-utilised and sidelined labour of 
women lawyers, particularly WFWRs. Furthermore, profoundly gendered 
assumptions justify the continuation of work practices that are 
discriminatory and demand redress. Meaningful change must surely depend 
on success in revolutionising the consciousness of men.130 That will not 
easily be achieved, as it will require cultural and attitudinal change to the 
ideological foundations that ground gender roles in both the public and the 
private spheres. Presumably, however, a better understanding of the breadth 
of the problems that systemic barriers present to sexual equality in corporate 
law firms will enable more targeted and effective responses from those 
fighting the good fight to facilitate full and equal participation for women. It 
can only be hoped that we do not have to wait until ‘all that is solid melts 
into air and all that is holy profaned’131 before change occurs. 
                                                           
127  Male Senior Associate, interview recorded in Melbourne, 4 August 2005. 
128  Warren CJ (2006). 
129  Crain (2004), p 558. 
130  hooks (1995), p 4. 
131  Marx (1972a), p 338. 
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